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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARY DOE, Guardian ad Litem for 
JANE DOE, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
ROBERTO v. ARGUELLES, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 19061 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff-Appellant to recove1 
damages against the Defendants for injuries received by the ward 
of the Plaintiff-Appellant as a result of a violent sexual as· 
saul t upon her person by the Defendant Roberto Arguelles. The 
Plaintiff-Appellant contends that the Defendants were grossly 
nPgligent, reckless, wilful!, and negligent in their confinement, 
t rpatment and release of the Defendant Roberto Arguelles from the 
Youth Development Center (Y.D.C.). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Third Di strict Court, Judge Philip R. Fi shler pr" 
siding, granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgme: 
dismissing Plaintiff-Appellant's Complaint on two grounds: 
1. The acts complained of were discretionary functi:, 
for which the State Defendants have Statutory Immunity; and 
2. The State Defendants have Quasi-Judicial Immun:, 
for decisions made by and pursuant to paroling authority. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks to have the District Cour: 
Order dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint reversed and have t: 
case remanded to the Third District Court for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant Roberto V. Arguelles' arrest record, 
found on Page 178 of the Record on Appeal, reveals, in add1t 1 
to various crimes against property, that on 10/6/78, he 0 
arrested for sexual abuse; on 11/9/78, he was arrested for,. 
omy; and on 2/26/79, he was arrested for two counts of rape 
should be noted that the sexual abuse charge and the 5''' 
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charge were against 10-year-old and 6-year-old girls respective-
ly. All of these crimes occurred prior to the vicious assault on 
the plaintiff-appellant's ward, which is the basis of this law-
suit. 
Without exception, the health care professionals who 
examined the defendant Arguelles make reference to his propensity 
for violence and, specifically, sexual violence. On March 27, 
1979, Spencer Wood, M.S., a psychologist employed at the Utah 
State Hospital, conducted a psychological evaluation of thf 
defendant. Mr. Wood's report states in part: 
"The sexual acting out represents a serious 
social problem, but since Robert is not emo-
tionally disturbed, he should be held account-
able for his behavior. Unfortunately, the 
lack of motivation and characterlogical traits 
combine to make him a poor treatment candi-
date." (emphasis added) 
(Page 339, Record on Appeal) 
On March 29, 1979, Kenneth Slaugh, Psychiatric Social 
Worker, and Cantril Nielsen, M.D., Director - Youth Services, 
employees of the State Mental Hospital, conducted evaluations of 
the defendant Arguelles. Their summary was as follows: 
. his emotional stability was such that 
he could and should be held accountable for 
his behaviors. 
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Our evaluations also revealed that Robert 
is mainly characterlogical in nature and that 
his reactions and interactions were mostly on 
an adult level. He is an extremely sophisti-
cated, smooth individual who is capable of 
manipulating his environment for his own 
satisfaction and pleasure and uses such mech-
anisms as anger and violence to achieve these 
ends. 
Our recommendations of clinical staff at 
the Youth Center was that Robert be returned 
to the court and held accountable for his 
behaviors and also indicated that we saw him 
as a dan erous ind1v1dual who is in need of a 
secure our res 1 ent ia se ting. emp -
as1s added) 
(Page 343, Record on Appeal) 
Further, under "Recommended Therapeutic Modalities" in the __ 
Report, it was stated: 
"As was previously mentioned we feel quite 
strongly that Robert is a dangerous individual 
and is in need of a 24 hour residential set-
ting. We feel that he can be held responsible 
for his behaviors and should be and that in 
the future he may benefit from some counseling 
efforts if he can be controlled to the extent 
that he does not sabotage or manipulate the 
counseling efforts." 
(Page 344, Record on Appeal) 
In the July 16, 1979, report prepared by Marge 
Wilburn, Ph.D., psychologist at the Utah State Hospital, · 
defendant admitted to killing another individual who had str'"l 
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him in the face. Dr. Wilburn drew the conclusion: "He is un-
motivated for treatment and not appropriate for the Sexual Of-
fenders Program." (Page 347, Record on Appeal) 
In a letter dated March 27, 1979, from Kenneth Slaugh, 
Psychiatric Social Worker, and Cantril Nielsen, M.D., Director -
Youth Services (Page 199, Record on Appeal) on evaluation was 
written to the Honorable Regn al W. Garff, Jr., the sentencing 
judge of the defendant, which stated, among other things, that 
the reason for the defendant Arguelles being at the State 
pital Youth Center was because of the defendant's "recent sexual 
acting-out and his potentially violent behavior". 
"We recognize that Robert's sexual deviancy is 
an extremely serious problem but cannot just-
ify or conclude that it is a direct result of 
any major mental illness. We feel quite 
strongly that the actions Robert took against 
the younger girls was out of anger, and that 
he acted with full knowledge and control of 
his behavior. 
Our clinical staff finds that Robert is 
mainly characterolog ical in nature and that 
his reactions and interactions are on an adult 
level. We have been able to easily ascertain 
that Robert is an extremely sophisticated, 
smooth individual who is capable of manipulat-
ing his environment for his own satisfaction 
and pleasure. We are quite convinced that the 
anger and violence that Robert shows are 
results of Robert not being able to manipulate 
his environment and are ways in which he can 
usually end up getting what he wants. 
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at the Youth 
Probation Unit that 
in a secure, 2 4-hour 
resi entia 
{Defendants' Exhibit 13) (emphasis added) 
(Page 341, Record on Appeal) 
Mark Smith was the Probation Officer of the defenda 
Arguelles and it was his desire that Arguelles should serve 
the Sex Offender Program at the State Mental Hospital. The Sto-
Mental Hospital refused to accept the defendant Arguelles 
his refusal to cooperate in the treatment and due to the fct 
that it was their professional opinion that his problem •· 
characterological rather than psychotic. It was felt that 
defendant should be placed in a penal-type ins ti tut ion, such 
the Y.D.C. Mark Smith therefore recommended that the defenda 
be placed in a secure, residential setting for long-term tre: 
ment. (Page 351, Record on Appeal). Mr. Smith was the mo'i: 
force behind trying to get defendant Arguelles in the Sex 
fender Program at the State Mental Hospital. This was due to -
fact that he felt that the defendant was dangerous enough tha' 
had to be in a "basically lock-up situation where the pa'-' 
does not have the ability to run away", (Mark Smith deposi'. 
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page 101), and that the "State Hospital Sexual Offenders Program 
was the best appropriate facility". (Smith deposition, page 
1 02). He felt, however, that since the Sex Offenders Program 
refused to accept him, "he had to consider the community and had 
to recommend commitment.• 
"I had reviewed the reluctance of other facil-
ities to accept, and I had reviewed the recom-
mendations from 5 or 6 psychological and 
psychiatric institutions and I think I made it 
very clear that he was a threat to the com-
muni tt." (emphasis added) 
(Smit deposition, page 103) 
The defendant Arguelles was, therefore, "committed to 
the custody of the Superintendent of the State Youth Development 
Center for secure care, education and training for a minimum of 
six months and until legally discharged as provided by law.' 
U.C.A. 64-6-12 states: 
"Every person committed to the school shall 
remain until he shall arrive at the age of 19 
years, or be legally discharged. " 
Judge Garff was so concerned about the circumstances of 
Arc111elles' commitment to the Y.D.C. that in addition to the 
Commitment Order, he also sent a letter to the Y.D.C. (Page 353, 
Re,:·ord on Appeal). In the Judge's deposition, he stated that he 
-7-
had only written three of such letters in all of his years on: 
Bench; he did so to articulate his grave concerns about : 
defendant Arguelles. The sentencing order gave the Y.D.C. sur:e 
intendent some flexibility as to the actual release date. 
"It would give you some flexibility as to his 
release date and would make it possible for 
him to be released prior to a 6-month period 
from this date. However, it is also explained 
that this is not something he should expect 
because it can also mean that he can be at the 
institution until he is 21 ears of a e ••.. 
I wou ope at t is point since t is is an 
outright commitment that the Youth Development 
Center would be able to pull together a treat-
ment program for his particular needs. 
As you read the information in the Social 
File, you will see that there was grave con-
cern by those experts who have evaluated him, 
that he constitutes a danger to the community 
because of his sexual aggressiveness and 
acting-out behavior. I think it is imperative 
that he have a treatment program that is 
effective for him and that he res onds to 
be ore e is release to t e community, 
whether this takes a few months or a few 
I don't believe that anyone else 
s ou e Jeopar ize y is e avior unti 
state has met its res onsibil1t treat 
o im in custo y. (emp as1s a de 
(Page 353, Record on Appeal) 
In Judge Garff' s deposition, he stated his reasons 1 
writing the letter as follows: 
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logue: 
"Because I was incensed at the - - you know 
it is obvious from the procedures that I 
used that I was struggling to find what I 
would be an appropriate program for 
this young man; but I considered him to be 
dangerous and that he needed some psychother-
apy to deal with the problem. I felt like I 
had been given the run-around at any possible 
treatment facilities the state had, and so, 
out of desperation, he was sent to the YDC. I 
was angry and I wanted to appraise him of the 
fact that I considered this young man to be 
dangerous. 11 (emphasis added) 
(Garff deposition, page 33). 
Judge Garff' s deposition reflects the following dia-
"Q: Did you ever have an anticipation that 
Mr. Arguelles would be kept at the Youth 
Development Center for a few years? 
A: Yes, that crossed my mind because I didn't 
know if they could put a treatment program 
together for him and I really felt that he was 
the kind of person that if they couldn't do 
that, then he needed to be held as long as 
possible." 
(Garff's deposition, page 37) 
Mark Smith, in his deposition, had concern about send-
ing the defendant Arguelles to the Youth Development Center 
because he felt he could "manipulate the system" and "float 
lhr:ough the system". (Smith deposition, page 117). He stated: 
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"I had some concern that with the Youth Devel-
opment Center's program, is basically a be-
havior and modification type, earn points and 
have home visits type of situation, have 
privileges and be able to earn your release, I 
think Robert would very quickly figure out 
what he would have to do and how fast he would 
have to do it and take care of it very quick-
ly." 
Mark Smith further stated: 
"Usually subsequent behavior of a serious 
nature will catch you off-guard a little bit 
by surprise and you can kind of have to go 
after the fact. The unusual nature with 
Robert's case was that he was red-flagged way 
early in the system. He probably had more 
psychological and psychiatrists and evalua-
tions done than any client I have worked with, 
and I have never heard any one of my clients 
having any more done than he did in terms of 
predicting possible future behavior .. 
Q: So you were not surprised of his rape of 
Jane Doe? 
A: I was not surprised. 
Q: Did you feel that that was foreseeable? 
A: Yes." 
(Smith deposition, pages 127 and 128) 
Benjamin Taylor, M.D., psychiatrist, who contracts,, 
the Youth Development Center, issued a number of repori 
defendant Stromberg and the State Youth Development Center. 
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full text of said reports are found in defendants' Exhibit 15. 
In the April 24, 1979, report, Dr. Taylor states: 
"I asked if he had ever seriously hurt anyone 
and he commented, 'I've messed people up. 
I've used bats on people. But I've never been 
busted for that.' 
(Page 208, Record on Appeal) 
With some pride, Robert then commented, 'I've 
stabbed people.'" 
(Page 209, Record on Appeal) 
Further, in the April 24th report, Taylor summarizes: 
"I consider that Robert has to be thought of 
as being dangerous, both in regards to harming 
women and, for that matter, male persons." 
(Page 210, Record on Appeal) 
On April 30, 1979, Dr. Taylor issued another report_ 
He ends that report by stating: 
"I had occasion to talk to Mr. about 
this interview and I have also talked with Mr. 
Tatten on two occasions in regard to Robert. 
It is my feeling that Robert very likely will 
act out a ain a gressivel in a sexual context 
wit gir s or women. It is my ee ing t at if 
no therapeutic program is brought to bear, 
that Robert very likely will seriously harm a 
woman or a girl at sometime in his life or 
may, in fact, be harmed by them. It is abund-
antly obvious that his relationship women 
is literally associated with aggressive themes 
and acting out. . It would be my feeling 
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report: 
that whatever planning is effected for this 
young man, that intensive, on-going therapy 
should be a part of any program. Diagnost-
ically, I do not think that Robert gives 
evidence of psychosis, diagnostic category 
would like fall int he area of neurotic and 
characterological difficulties." (emphasis 
added) 
(Page 214, Record on Appeal) 
On June 14, 1979, Mr. Taylor issued the followi· 
"The association of sexuality and fighting has 
been consistent in this young man's life." 
(Page 215, Record on Appeal) 
Dr. Taylor goes on to actually predict the attack that the d, 
fendant Arguelles perpetrated on the plaintiff, that is the bas· 
of this lawsuit, when he stated: 
"I think Robert needs to be in a long-term 
psychotherapy program where he can obtain some 
understanding of his association of sexuality 
and aggression and can work with these two 
things. It is my feeling that if this young 
man does not get help in this matter, there is 
a goOd llkehhoOd that Robert 
will find themselves in a ver 
tion at sometime in is life, 
o aggressive acting out. 
(Page 217, Record on Appeal) 
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Of particular relevance is Dr. Taylor's psychiatric 
note of August 28, 1979, in which he discussed the program that 
was being set up for the defendant as a treatment program. He 
states: 
"In any event I was not a bit encouraged by 
this discussion. It sounded very fly-by-night 
and perhaps even f ictious. My opinion about a 
therapy program for this young man would be a 
very substantial therapist, perhaps two or 
even three times a week." 
(Page 218, Record on Appeal) 
They discussed the use of a female therapist and 
"talked about the evidently mutually aggressive relationship of 
one of his girlfriends and he assured me, with a pleasant smile, 
that he had learned now to give up fighting with girls." In 
summation, Dr. Taylor states: 
"I am still concerned greatly about this young 
man and other persons with whom he might come 
in contact. He is good looking, he is quite 
successful in his way, and more to the point, 
he has so far been successful in skating 
through various dangerous situations. . . • I 
feel that it is certain that this young man 
will get into further difficulty if there are 
not very considerable changes effected by way 
of therapeutic program and other efforts. 
I have spoken with Mr. Stromberg on several 
about the letter received from Jud e 
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gathering in regard to a program for Robert 
can be accomplished soon." 
(Page 219, Record on Appeal) 
That was the last mee.ting Dr. Taylor had with , 
defendant Arguelles, but nothing in any of the reports prepar, 
by Dr. Taylor indicates in any way that he had responded tc 
treatment program. In fact, it refers only to the formulation 
a treatment program. Therefore, nothing within Dr. Taylor' 
reports would indicate that the State had complied with Jud 
Garff's requirements in his August 7, 1979, letter, or tL 
Arguelles had become in any way less dangerous. 
The defendant Arguelles was then interviewed and mr 
ined by Janet Warburton, Psychology Trainee at the Y .D.C. 
issued a report on November 8, 1979, in which she stated: 
"He was seen as characterological and is now 
thought to be more appropriate for a correc-
tional placement. While testing and mental 
status exam tend to confirm this, it is of 
critical importance that Robert deal with his 
emotional problems with women. He has so 
closely paired sex and aggression that he is a 
danger, and if not dealt with in a therapeutic 
sense will undoubtedly hurt other women. 
It is strongly recommended that Robert 
begin long-term out-patient psycho therapy as 
a condition and as part of his home visits. 
He should be released only after he is well 
established in such a therapeutic relationshi 
w1 a ma ure ema e erap1s • n 1 o er 
has resolved some of his aggress1ve/sexuaf 
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feelings he must continue to be 
danger. 11 (emphasis added} 
(Page 264, Record on Appeal} 
seen as a 
Again, it is important to note that just one month 
prior to his release, the psychologist assigned to him still sees 
him as being a danger toward women in terms of aggressive sexual 
acting out. There is nothing within this report that indicate$ 
he has in any way responded to any type of treatment. 
It should be noted that prior to the defendant's re-
lease, the defendant only had one visit, that being on November 
30, 1979, with Annette Gilmore, who was a graduate student in 
social work, working in family counseling for FHP. Nothing in 
her records would indicate that a "therapeutic relationship had 
been established." On December 5, 1980, just two weeks prior to 
the defendant's release, the following notation was made in Janet 
Warburton's chart: 
"Long-term therapy and a carefully monitored 
release program ••• I concur [he's too good 
to be true] watch! 
On the basis of my limited observations, he 
has high potential for being dangerous and 
needs to be carefully followed up by P.O. for 
treatment." 
(Page 355, Record on Appeal} 
-15-
The professional view, again, is that the defenc, 
Arguelles was still a danger to others. In spite of all of 
foregoing, the State Youth Development Center entered intc 
placement agreement with the defendant on December 19, 1979, : 
placement requirement was: 
1. Robert will reside with his mother; 
2. Robert will attend community school Monday 
through Thursday, 6:00 to 10:00; 
3. Robert must obey all civil laws; 
4. Robert will maintain weekly contact with 
his placement officer, Craig Berthold, for 
the first 30 days of his placement and 
thereafter on a schedule set up by Robert 
and his placement officer; 
5. Robert will meet weekly with Annette 
Gilmore (Annette Gilmore was crossed out 
and "a professional counselor" handwritten 
over her name); 
6. Robert will work regularly at Owens Insul-
ation. 
(Page 272, Record on Appeal) 
It is important to note that in that placement agr" 
ment, Annette Gilmore's name was crossed out and "professior' 
counselor" was added. There fore, it was a requirement tor 
release that he attend counseling sessions with a profess;r, 
counselor. This never occurred. 
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The only counselor that defendant Arguelles had any 
contact with after his release from the Y.D.C. was Annette 
Gilmore, a graduate student in social work. He met with her 
prior to his release on November 30, 1979; he met with her again 
on December 14, 1979; then on December 21, 1979; then on January 
4, 1980; and not again until February 18, 1980; and then on 
February 22, 1980. That was the last occasion on which the 
defendant met with the student, Annette Gilmore. A review of 
Annette Gilmore's chart, found at page 357 of the Record on 
Appeal, indicates the sessions that the defendant Arguelles had 
with Annette Gilmore could, in no way, be called intensive psy-
chotherapy, or for that matter, any type of therapy. The conver-
sations are light and do not deal with his sexual acting-out 
problems. It is clear from reading these notes that the sessions 
were not the type of therapy either contemplated by Judge Garff 
or required by the release agreement. The August 28, 1979, 
meeting with Dr. Taylor was, in fact, the last occasion that the 
defendant Arguelles really spent with a "professional thera-
pist". In paragraph 37 of the defendants' Statement of Facts, it 
is stated: 
"When Mr. Stromberg was informed at the exit 
interview that the counselor Arguelles had 
been seeing at Family Health Plan was a grad-
uate student, he amended the agreement and 
-17-
required that the parole officer either make 
sure that a professional counsel 
himself or supervise Annette 
graduate student." 
(Page 119, Record on Appeal) 
see Arguelles 
Gilmore, the 
U.C.A. §64-6-8 gave to defendant Stromberg the L_ 
power to retake the defendant into custody when he found out tJ;· 
Gilmore was treating the defendant. Prior to the date t:,: 
Arguelles was actually released, the defendant Stromberg .,, 
aware that Gilmore was the therapist whom defendant Arguell,, 
would be seeing; and he changed the language of the relea' 
agreement as stated above. However, no act ion was taken 
insure that the defendant Arguelles would see a "professiona 
therapist" after his release. There is no evidence to suppc: 
the fact that Stromberg had determined that the defenda 
Arguelles was well established in such a therapeutic relationsh: 
with a mature female therapist prior to his release. As a 
of the State's inability to deal with the problem of defenda: 
Arguelles, and their inability to create a treatment program 
required by the letter from Judge Garff and as recommended by a. 
of their professional psychiatrists and psychologists, and fL· 
ther by the gross negligence of the defendant Stromberg in 
leasing the defendant Arguelles from custody in light of al· 
the foregoing information, on March 6, 1980, less than three 
-18-
months after defendant Arguelles' release, the defendant 
Arguelles kidnapped, raped, sodomized, stabbed, lacerated and 
slit the throat of the ward of the plaintiff. (Page 361, Record 
on Appeal) • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING AS A MATTER 
OF LAW THAT THE STATE DEFENDANTS HAVE A QUASI-
JUDICIAL IMMUNITY FOR THEIR DECISIONS AS TO 
WHEN TO RELEASE JUVENILES FROM THE STATE YOUTH 
DEVELOPMENT CENTER. 
The parameters of government employees' liability in 
the exercise of their governmental function is contained solely 
within the provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, 
U.C.A. 63-30-1. The Honorable Philip R. Fishler ruled, in 
ing the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, that the State 
Defendants were operating with a Quasi-Judicial Immunity in 
making their determination to release the defendant Roberto 
Arguelles from the Youth Development Center. The trial court, 
therefore, attempted to adopt a common law principle of Quasi-
1udLcial Immunity that was contrary to the provisions of U.C.A. 
'ib i- lll-1 (as amended). The California Supreme Court, in the case 
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of Drennan vs. Security Pacific National Bank, 621 P.2d 
{Cal., 1981) ruled that: 
"The common law, which petitioner urges us to 
apply, is superseded when the Legislature 
acts." 
Further, U.C.A. 68-3-2 states: 
"The rule of the common law that statutes in 
derogation thereof are to be strictly con-
strued has no application to the statutes of 
this state. The statutes establish the laws 
of this state respecting the subjects to which 
they relate, and their provisions and all 
proceedings under them are to be liberally 
construed with a view to respect the objects 
of the statutes and to promote justice. 
Whenever there is any variance between the 
rules of equity and the rules of common law in 
reference to the same matter, the rules of 
equity shall prevail." 
U.C.A. 63-30-10 states: 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for injury proximately caused 
by a negligent act or omission of an employee 
committed within the scope of his employment, 
except if the injury: 
(1) arises out of the exercise or perform-
ance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused, . 
U.C.A. 63-30-4 states: 
"Nothing contained in this act, unless specif-
ically provided, is to be construed as an 
admission or denial of liabilit! or responsi-
bility in so tar as government a en ti ties are 
concerned. Wherein immunity from suit is 
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waived by th is act, consent to be sued is 
granted and liability of the entity shall be 
determined as if the entity were a private 
person. (emphasis added) 
The remedy against a governmental entity or 
its employee for an injury caused by an act or 
omission which occurs during the performance 
of such employee's duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority is, 
after the effective date of this act, exclus-
ive of any other civil action or proceeding by 
reason of the same subject matter against the 
employee or the estate of the employee whose 
act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless 
the employee acted or failed to act through 
gross negligence, fraud, or malice. 
An employee may be joined in an action 
against a governmental entity in a represent-
ative capacity if the act or omission comp-
lained of is one for which the governmental 
entity may be liable, but no employee shall be 
held personally liable for acts or omissions 
occurring during the performance of the em-
ployee's duties, within the scope of employ-
ment or under color of authority, unless it is 
established that the employee acted or failed 
to act due to gross negligence, fraud or 
malice." 
It is apparent that it was the intent of the Utah State 
Legislature to abandon the archaic concept of sovereign 
ity. Clearly, if a common law Quasi-Judicial Immunity existed, 
the Governmental Immunity Act supersedes that immunity. The Utah 
s u f-lr eme Co lff t, in the case of St ate Land Board vs. St ate Depart-
ment of Fish & Game, 408 P.2d 707 (Utah, 1965), gave guidelines 
t''t slat u tory interpretation. The Court stated: 
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"Further, with respect to the meaning of 
statutes, it is appropriate to look to the 
intended purpose and to the meaning of accomp-
lishing it by the proper application of the 
language used." 
U.C.A. S68-3-2 states: 
"The provisions of the statutes of the State 
are to be liberally construed with a view to 
effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice." 
It was the intent of the Utah Legislature in enactr 
the Governmental Immunity Act to define the extent of liabili 
of governmental employees in the exercise of their offic!' 
duties. Waiver of immunity is the rule; the immunity from su; 
which has been retained is specifically defined in §63-30-101' 
through (11). 
The Arizona Supreme Court, in Grimm vs. The Arizor 
Board of Pardons and Paroles, 564 P.2d 1227 (Ariz., 1977), a ca'· 
very similar to the instant action, ruled that public officiai 
acting in other than true judicial proceedings do not have ar 
solute immunity from suit in their discretionary functions. Th. 
was a case arising out of the parole of a known, dangerous cnr 
inal who had killed the decedent in an armed robbery. An actl 
was brought by the heirs of the decedent against the Arizona 
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Board of Pardons and Paroles. In addressing the issue of Quasi-
,Judicial Immunity, the Court stated: 
"It is clear that the policy reasons for 
official immunity are much weaker than for 
judical immunity. Thus, logic requires a 
lesser immunity; for immunity deprives indiv-
iduals of a remedy for wrongdoing and should 
be bestowed only when and at the level neces-
sary. We hold that absolute immunity for 
public officials in their discretionary func-
tions acting in other than true judicial 
proceedings is not required and, indeed, is 
improper." at page 1232) 
The Court went further to rule: 
"While society may want and need courageous, 
independent policy decisions among high level 
government officials, there seems to be no 
benefit and, indeed, great potential harm in 
allowing unbridled discretion without fear of 
being held to account for their actions for 
every single public official who exercises 
discretion. In this day of increasing 
power wielded by governmental officials, 
absolute immunity for nonjudicial, nonlegis-
lative officials is outmoded and even danger-
ous." (_!9... at page 1232). 
In this case,the position of the State of Utah regard-
ing Quasi-Judicial Immunity is that no claim can vest against the 
State Defendants, however wrongful their conduct, for the reason 
that those Defendants are "in this shield of Quasi-Judicial 
Immunity". This is directly contrary to the specific language of 
l l0-4 which states: 
-2 3-
"Nothing contained in this Act, unless specif-
ically provided, is to be construed as an 
admission or denial of liability or responsi-
bility insofar as government entities are 
concerned." (emphasis added) 
There is, therefore, no basis in Utah law for t: 
concept of Quasi-Judicial Immunity. All State employees, 
they are judges, state prosecutors, or legislators, are liab: 
for their wrongful conduct unless the State can meet its burde 
of showing that the wrongful conduct is within the immunity frc 
liability retained in §63-30-10. 
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in Ryan v. State, 6: 
P.2d 597 ( 1982), addressed this issue of the non-accountabil1: 
of government employees for their wrongful conduct. In th; 
case, the director of the Arizona Youth Center was sued to re 
cover for injuries inflicted by an escapee on the husband of u 
plaintiff by an individual who had a long history of escape a: 
violent conduct. The Court found that the State of Arizona " 
liable for the injuries received by the plain ti ff, and stated: 
"We think that a sound public policy requires 
that public officials and employees shall be 
held accountable for their negligence in the 
performance of their official duties to those 
who suffer injury by reason of their miscon-
duct. Public off ice or employment should not 
be made a shield to protect careless public 
officials from the consequences of their 
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misfeasance in the performance of their public 
duties." 
State employees should not be able to hide behind the 
outmoded concept of Quasi-Judicial Immunity; they should be held 
liable for their wrongful conduct. The scope of immunity for 
governmental employees is contained within §63-30-1 O ( 1) through 
( 11). Unless a cause of action is within one of those specific-
ally retained areas of immunity, the plaintiff should have the 
opportunity to have the case heard by a trier of fact. In this 
case, the Plaintiff-Appellant's causes of action as stated in her 
Com pl a int do not fal 1 with in the retention of irnmun i ty in the 
Utah Statute. Therefore, the lower Court's ruling should be 
reversed and the case remanded for trial. 
' j ( 
POINT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
IN RULING AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE DECISION 
OF RONALD STROMBERG, INDIVIDUALLY AND ON 
BEHALF OF THE UTAH STATE YOUTH DEVELOPMENT 
CENTER, TO RELEASE DEFENDANT ROBERTO ARGUELLES 
FROM THE Y.D.C. WAS A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION 
AND, THEREFORE, WOULD HAVE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 63-30-1(1). 
The definition as to what action constitutes a discre-
function has been the subject of numerous appellate 
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dee is ions. The State of Utah argues that so long as thP ""t· 
ant Stromberg was required to weigh several factors ancl 
ives in making the decision to release the defendant Arquc! 
from incarceration, his decision must be deemed to be "dis 2 
tionary" within the meaning of §63-30-10(1). This conclusior; 
clearly not supported by recent Utah case law. The definition, 
"discretionary function" was clearly articulated in two recc 
Utah cases: Frank v. State, 613 P.2d 517 (Utah, 1980); 
Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d 50 (Utah, 1980). 
The Frank case arose out of a lawsuit against t: 
University Medical Center. The plaintiff's son, Jack Algar, r· 
been a student at the University of Utah, during which time 
had undergone psychiatric treatment at the University of UL 
Medical Center. The plaintiff alleged that prior to his son' 
death, his son had notified those charged with his care that: 
had previously attempted suicide. It was alleged that the Ce 
fendants failed to take any action to restrain, counsel or asst' 
him. In a short period of time, he was released from the Uni•1°: 
sity Medical Center and pC>rmi tted to go on his way unsupervis" 
whereupon he committed suicide. 
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The plaintiff then filed suit, joining the State of 
Utah and the doctors as defendants, alleging that they had neg-
1 igently handled his son's case. The defendants moved for sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that the State of Utah, as owners of 
the Medical Center, and the doctor, as an employee thereof, were 
protected by sovereign immunity as defined in the Utah 
mental Immunity Act. This Motion was granted and the plaintiff's 
suit dismissed. The plaintiff appealed and the Utah Supreme 
Court reversed and remanded for trial. 
Justice Hall, writing for unanimous Court, held that 
the actions by the staff at the University Medical Center were 
not protected by the Governmental Immunity Act, and that even 
though their conduct required a large amount of discretion, it 
was not a "discretionary function". The Court adopted a "basic 
pol icy level vs. operational• definition of the old discretion-
ary/proprietary exceptions to the Governmental Immunity Act 
stating: 
"The Court recognizes the high degree of 
careful observation, evaluation, and educated 
j udgrnent reflected in any modern medical 
prognosis, and makes no suggestion that a 
large measure of "discretion," as commonly 
defined, is not involved. The exception to 
the statutory waiver here under consideration, 
however, was intended to shield those govern-
mental acts and decisions impacting on large 
numbers of people in a myriad of unforeseeable 
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ways from individual and class legal actions, 
the continual threat of which would make 
public administration all but impossible. The 
one-to-one dealings of physician and patient 
in no way reflect this public policy-making 
posture, and should not be given shelter under 
the Act. We therefore hold that immunity is 
waived by operation of the Act, and that the 
State of Utah may not escape liability by 
reason thereof •••• For this reason, we hold 
that defendant Erickson's acts in this case 
were not legally discretionary, but minister-
ial. • The decision of the trial court is 
reversed and remanded for trial on the merits 
of plaintiff's claim." (l.;!. page 520) 
This policy level vs. operational analysis of gove' 
mental immunity was more thoroughly articulated by this Court 
the case of Bigelow vs. Ingersoll, 618 P.2d SO (Utah, 1980). 
that case, Justice Stewart, again writing for the unani.JK 
Court, defined a discretionary function as follows: 
"According to the definition of discretion 
established in Frank v. State, supra., the 
discretionary function under 63-30-10(1) is 
confined to those decisions and acts occurring 
at the basic policy-making level, and not 
extended to those acts and decisions taking 
place at the operational level, or, in other 
words, those which concern routine, everyday 
matters, not requiring evaluation of broad 
policy actions." page 53) 
It is clear that the broad policy-makinq/operat i-
determination of governmental functions is the standurd by " 1 -
this case must be analyzed. The discretionary function uf 
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State in this instance is the establishment of criteria, rules 
and reg ul at ions under which the detainee may be allowed to be 
placed outside the facility. The power to adopt such rules and 
regt1lations is granted to the Superintendent of the Y.D.C. pur-
suant to U.C.A. §64-6-8, which states: 
supra.,: 
"The Superintendent may, subject to the ap-
proval of the Board of Family Services, estab-
1 ish rules and regulations under which any 
student may be allowed to be placed outside 
the school." 
The Arizona Supreme Court stated in the Grimm case, 
"Immunity is granted only for policy level 
functions because strong public pol icy argu-
ments apply: for example, there are no re-
liable criteria for judging a major policy 
decision and there is a need for fearless 
decision making at that level." 
It is the establishment of these criteria, rules and 
regulations, which is the act occurring at the "basic policy-
making level" and which is protected by the Utah Governmental 
lmmunity Act. The implementation of said rules, regulations and 
er 1 teria on a case-by-case basis is the operational level, and 
11nt protected by the Governmental Immunity Act. Therefore, the 
de,, 1 sum to release an individual from the Youth Development 
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Center is not protected by §63-30-10(1). The failure of 
Stromberg, Superintendent of the Y.D.C., to follow the establio 
ed rules, regulations and guidelines, and directions from, 
sentencing judge, is a factual determination that need to be mo 
by a trier-of-fact; it was inappropriate and reversible error' 
the District Court Judge to determine the issue on a Motion f 
Summary Judgment. 
Without exception, each and every heal th care prov id, 
and mental heal th professional that examined Roberto Argue!L 
stated emphatically that he was a dangerous individual with h1: 
propensity for future violent acts. The scars that the Pla1-
t if f's ward carries on her throat and in her mind attest tot' 
fact that Ronald Stromberg made a mistake in releasing Rober-
Arguelles. The decision to release Roberto Arguelles from 
Y.D.C. was not a discretionary function, it was an operatioc 
al/ministerial function. The question for determination l' 
whether that mistake was negligent or grossly negligent. 
The only recourse that the plaintiff's ward has 
recover for her injuries is to exercise her right in Court 
have her grievances heard before an impartial tribunal. That 
a fundamental right that should not be taken away from a cJti 
based on some outmoded, archaic concept that "The King Can 00 
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Wrong". We all know that the king can do wrong, and frequently 
does. 
In Selmar vs. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, 
538 F.2d 121 (1976), a case where plaintiff brought an 
action against the Psychiatric Institute of Washington o.c. and a 
Virginia parole officer to recover for the death of her daughter 
who was killed by a Virginia probationer who had been a patient 
of the Institute. The plaintiff alleged that probation officer 
failed to comply strictly with the terms of the sentencing 
judge's probation order. The probation officer raised the 
cretionary judgment defense. In response to that defense, the 
Court of Appeals held: 
"Under Virginia law, a State employee who 
exercises discretionary judgment within the 
scope of his employment is immune from liabil-
ity for negligence. Conversely, he is liable 
if injury results from negligent performance 
of a ministerial act. • • A probation of-
ficer's basic policy decisions are discretion-
ary and hence, immune. But his acts imple-
menting the policy must be considered on a 
case-by-case basis to determine whether they 
are ministerial." page 127) 
The Plaintiff-Appellant has but one request: the 
'PIX•ttunity to have her case heard at trial. If the State De-
rPtidants' actions were appropriate in this instance, then they 
hdvP nothing to fear from a trial. Considering the fact that 
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there is a reasonable basis in fact and law to support the ct 
of the Plaintiff-Appellant as contained in her Complaint, 
should be given the opportunity to have her grievances aga.· 
the State of Utah heard at trial; therefore, justice requ1, 
that this Court reverse the District Court's Order Dismiss 
Plaintiff's Complaint and remand this case for trial. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR 
BY DISMISSING AS A MATTER OF LAW DEFENDANT 
RONALD STROMBERG INDIVIDUALLY FROM THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED ACTION WHERE THE PLAINTIFF HAD PRAYED 
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR GROSS NEGLIGENCE AND 
THERE WERE SUFFICIENT FACTS BEFORE THE COURT 
TO CREATE A QUESTION OF FACTS AS TO THAT 
ISSUE. 
Utah Code Annotated 63-30-4 states in part: 
"No employee shall be held personally liable 
for acts or omissions occurring during the 
performance of the employee's duties, within 
the scope of employment or under color of 
authority unless it is established that the 
employee acted or failed to act due to gross 
fraud or malice." (emphasis 
ad ed 
The Plaintiff-Appellant alleged in her Complaint' 
Ronald Stromberg and the Y.D.C. had actual knowledge of 
violent and dangerous propensities of the defendant Arquei 
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that notwithstanding said knowledge, they released Arguelles from 
the Youth Development Center in reckless disregard of the health, 
safety and well-being of society; that the actions of the State 
Youth Development Center, Ronald Stromberg and Jeff McBride, in 
the confinement, treatment, and release and/or parole of Roberto 
Arguelles constituted gross negligence which proximately cause<l 
the injuries sustained by the ward of Plaintiff-Appellant. The 
Plaintiff-Appellant, therefore, properly plead gross negligence 
against Ronald Stromberg and stands ready to prove the same at 
trial. 
follows: 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "gross negligence" as 
"The intentional failure to perform a manifest 
duty in reckless disregard of the consequences 
as affecting the life or property of another; 
such a gross want of care and regard for the 
rights of others as to justify the presumption 
of willfulness and wantonness. 
Indifference to present legal duty and 
utter forgetfulness of legal obligations, so 
far as other persons may be affected, and a 
manifestly smaller amount of watchfulness 
circumspection than the circumstances require 
of a IJerson of ordinary prudence. [Burke vs. 
246 Mass. 518, 141 N.E. 585]. 
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Section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Toe 
(1965), states: 
supra.: 
"One who takes charge of a third person whom 
he knows or should know to be likely to cause 
bodily harm to others if not controlled, is 
under a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
control the third person to prevent him from 
doing such harm." 
The Arizona Supreme Court stated in the Grimm ca, 
"If the entire record of the prisoner reveals 
violent propensities and there is absolutely 
no reasonable basis for belief that he has 
changed, then a decision to release the pris-
oner would be grossly negligent or reck-
less." (.!2_. at page 1234) 
The Plaintiff-Appellant has alleged and will prove 
trial, if given the opportunity, that Ronald Stromberg was gros 
ly negligent and ignored the clear and unmistakable warnings 
all of the profess ion al mental heal th personnel who evaluat· 
Roberto Arguelles. 
Roberto Arguelles was indeed a very dangerous indi;. 
ual who needed to be incarcerated. Judge Garff's lette' 
Ronald Stromberg, dated August 7, 1979, made it very clear 3 ' 
his concern. Judge Garff placed on Ronald Stromberg a duty tr 
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"Have a treatment program that is effective 
for him and that he responds to it before he 
is released back to the community, whether 
this takes a few months or a few years. I 
don't believe that anyone else should be 
jeopardized by his behavior until the State 
has met its responsibility to treat the prob-
lem; or if that isn't possible, to hold him in 
custody." (Judge Garff's emphasis in original 
letter) 
(Page 353, Record on Appeal) 
Judge Garff expressed his concerns about the dangerous-
ness of the defendant Arguelles and clearly instructed the de-
fendant Stromberg that Arguelles was to be treated and respond to 
treatment or hold him in custody. The Judge was clearly trying 
to protect the public from just the type of injury that Plain-
tiff-Appellant's ward sustained as a result of Ronald Stromberg' I'; 
releasing Arguelles from custody. The Judge stated further ir' 
his letter: 
"As you read the information and Social File, 
you will see that there is grave concern by 
those experts who have evaluated him, that he 
constitutes a danger to the community because 
of his sexual aggressiveness and acting out 
behavior." 
The defendant Stromberg's own expert, Dr. Benjamin 
Li i, >l , µred ict ed the very type of attack that occurred on Plain-
t i J f -Aµpe l lant' s ward in his June 14, 1979, statement quoted 
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above in the Statement of Facts. Janet Warburton, the "Psyc: 
ogist of Record" warned of it. Mark Smith, the defend 
Arguelles' probation officer, said in his deposition that 
very attack on Plaintiff-Appellant's ward was foreseeable. 
fact, Dr. Taylor stated that future violent acts were 
Arguelles did not receive further treatment. There is absolut, 
no evidence before this Court, or that was before the Distr: 
Court in Judge Fishler's ruling, that indicated that Rober 
Arguelles had responded to any treatment program or that he 1 
become any less dangerous prior to his release from the Y.D. 
The attack on Plaintiff-Appellant's ward proves that he was,. 
fact, dangerous and should not have been released. 
If all of the facts are taken in the light most favo 
able to the Plaintiff-Appellant and all reasonable inferences" 
drawn therefrom, there are sufficient facts to create the que 
tion of fact as to whether or not Ronald Stromberg was gross: 
negligent. It would be manifestly unjust to deny the Plaintif: 
Appellant the opportunity to have a trial on the issue of whethf 
or not the clear mistake of Ronald Stromberg in releasing Rober' 
Arguelles rose to the level of gross negligence. 
If the trier of fact de term in es that Ronald St rombP" 
actions in this regard were indeed reasonable, then justice 
served. If the trier of fact determines that Ronald Stromberg 
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this instance was grossly negligent and reckless, then justice is 
served. But if this Plaintiff-Appellant is denied the right and 
the opportunity to have her case heard at trial, then justice is 
thwarted. 
CONCLUSION 
The parameters of the liability of government employees. 
is contained within the Governmental Immunity Act. The 
mental Immunity Act has superseded and preempted any common law 
Quasi-Judicial Immunity that may or may not have existed. If the 
defendants are immune from suit, that immunity arises from the 
Governmental Immunity Act. The Frank and Bigelow cases clearly 
define the meaning of "discretionary function" within the State 
of Utah. By applying the rationale of those Courts using the 
operational vs. broad policy-making definitions, there can be 
only one conclusion drawn in the instant case: the decision to 
release Roberto 
i al. There fore, 
Arguelles was not discretionary but minister-
Ronald Stromberg, the Y.D.C., and the State of 
Ur ah cannot hide from their wrongful conduct behind the cloak of 
lflllllUil it y. 
,Justice and public policy demand that the public have 
snrne recourse against officers of the State of Utah for their 
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outrageous and wrongful conduct. The State, the Y.D.C., 
Ronald Stromberg had a duty to society to protect them 
dangerous and violent acts of the defendant Arguelles. 
defendant's duty was further magnified by the 
August 7th letter of Judge Garff to the Y. D. C. There is 
solutely no evidence to support a finding that defenda 
Arguelles had in any way changed or that an effective treatme 
program had been established. Without question there is 
evidence to suggest that the defendant Arguelles had responded· 
an effective treatment program before he was released back tot 
community. There is not a shred of evidence that points to·. 
fact that Arguelles had in any way become less dangerous. 
fact, the report of Janet Warburton just two weeks prior 
Arguelles' release showed that she still considered him to: 
dangerous. The defendants failed to see that Roberto ArgueL 
was not complying with their own requirements for release. 
was not receiving treatment by a professional counselor; he" 
only being seen on a bi-weekly basis by a student of soet• 
work. This is clearly not the level of treatment contemplated: 
Dr. Taylor, Janet Warburton, or Judge Garff. 
The facts, when taken in the light most favorable 
the Plaintiff-Appellant, and drawing all reasonable inferen. 
from those facts, clearly support the following concl•Js!O' 
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L The defendants breached their duty to the public; 2. The 
position that the type of harm inflicted on Plaintiff-Appellant's 
ward was a foreseeable result of the State defendants breach of 
their duty; 3. The proximate cause of the injury to the Plain-
tiff-Appellant's ward was the action or inaction of the defend-
ants; 4. There are sufficient facts to create a question of 
fact as to whether or not Ronald Stromberg's decision to release 
the defendant Arguelles, in light of all of the professional 
reports concerning his dangerous propensities and his high poten-0 
tial for violent acts, constitutes gross negligence. 
Summary Judgment is a harsh remedy and should only be 
used when reasonable minds cannot differ. Our system of justice 
is designed to give injured parties an opportunity to have their 
grievances heard impartially. The Plaintiff-Appellant therefore 
prays that this Court give her an opportunity to take her case to 
a trier of fact so she can prove that Ronald Stromberg was gross-
1 y negligent, that the attack by defendant Arguelles on the 
Plaintiff-Appellant's ward was caused directly and proximately by 
lhe negligence of the State of Utah and the Youth Development 
<:enter, and the gross negligence of Ronald Stromberg. 
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WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff-Appellant prays that the ao 
Court reverse the District Court's Order of Dismissal and rerni 
this case to the District Court for trial. 
DATED this 26th day of May, 1983. 
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